ABSTRACT
The problem of child labor has occupied a central place in the recent discussions on trade and development policy. Trade sanctions, import tariffs and product labeling (for example the Rugmark initiative in the carpet industry 2 ) have been proposed and in some instances, implemented, to reduce the extent of child labor. These sanctions have the effect of reducing the price of the exported good produced using child labor. The intended effect of this policy is to lower the demand for labor and thereby reduce the incentive to provide child labor. However, as Basu and Van (1998) have noted parents dislike child labor but have to endure it for generating household income. Therefore, a fall in the export price due to the sanction that leads to a lowering of the family income may induce the parents to offer more child labor. Since the substitution effect and the income effect go in opposite directions (in this context), it is unclear whether child labor may rise or fall due to a trade sanction.
Along with the theoretical literature on the issue there have been substantial empirical progress in recent times. 3 A recent paper by Edmonds and Pavcnik (2004a) looks at the effect of change in rice price in Vietnam on child labor and finds that the income effect is the dominant factor. Indeed, they find that when the price of rice goes up, the supply of child labor is lower 4 In a related paper, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2004b) explore this issue with cross-country evidence. Their findings suggest that a greater degree of openness of a nation is associated with lower child labor. When they control for income differences between nations, they find "..no evidence of a substantive or statistically significant association between trade and child labor." Therefore, the conclusion is that greater openness leads to higher incomes, reducing the incidence of child labor. Therefore, as in their other paper, the role of income in determining child labor is of critical importance. 2 because of the income effect. 4 The implication of this finding is that a trade sanction may actually end up raising child labor because of the strength of the income effect. Another important paper by Cigno and Rosati (2002) focuses on the effect of globalization on child labor.
They point out that nations with child labor are heterogeneous. Some have a greater proportion of skilled labor than others. The ones that have a greater proportion of skilled labor can participate in trade more effectively (by supplying intermediate products etc.) with developed countries. The rise in wages in these developing countries will be for the relatively more educated workers, raising the skill premium and discouraging child labor. On the other hand, countries who have a relative abundance of uneducated workers will see a rise in the unskilled wage through Stolper-Samuelson effects (as they face a greater demand due to globalization for their low skill intensive goods). For these countries there is more ambiguity regarding the effect of trade on child labor. The rise in the unskilled wage will raise the incentive to send children to work. However, as in Pavcnik (2004a and 2004b) , the wage hike will raise family incomes and that may reduce child labor if it is considered undesirable by the family.
This paper provides a framework within which one can see the interplay between these effects. It also presents a model of skill formation in general equilibrium that highlights the role of the factors that may affect the choice between child labor and skill acquisition. An issue that is closely related to this discussion is the presence of alternate employment opportunities for 5 There were 351.7 million economically active children in the world in year 2000. Of these 245.5 million count as child labour that need to be abolished (see ILO Conventions 138, 1973 and Convention 182, 1999) . 3 child labor outside of the sector that is facing the trade sanction. In other words, a trade sanction may be ineffective because of at least two reasons: (i) the income effect; and, (ii), the general equilibrium interaction between the traded good and in the alternate sector (say the non-traded service sector). The first effect has been discussed clearly in the existing literature. The second effect works as follows. A trade sanction on one of the sectors using child labor will tend to reduce the demand for child labor. However, the wage of child labor is also determined by the supply-demand condition in the non-traded sector. It is quite possible that the non-traded sector may soak up all the excess supply of child labor at the prevailing wage, leading to no impact of the sanction on child labor. Given the importance of the non-traded sector in hiring child labor in developing nations, this is an issue that should not be ignored. We propose a model that captures this general equilibrium linkage and lays down precise conditions under which a decline (or rise) in the terms of trade may reduce or raise child labor. Our general equilibrium model pays close attention to some of the stylized facts pertaining to child labor. The latest global count of child labour (ILO, 2002 ) is at 245.5 million children in the 5-17 age group in year 2000 of which 178.9 million children are engaged in hazardous work and unconditionally worst forms of child labor (as defined by ILO Convention 182, 1999) including forced and bonded labor, prostitution, etc.. 5 The problem is especially significant for Asia and the Pacific, with the highest count, and Sub-Saharan Africa, with the highest participation rate of working children. The agricultural sector employs most of the world's children (about 70% of economically active children). The children often work long 4 hours for low pay under difficult or hazardous working conditions. On the other hand, less than 17% of economically active children work in manufacturing, trade, hotels and restaurants, combined. According to ILO 2002, "The informal economy is a burgeoning field of economic activity to be found throughout the developing world as well as in transition and in some developed countries....The informal economy is where by far the most child laborers are found.
It cuts across all economic sectors and may be closely linked to formal sector production". The sector is typically characterized by a preponderance of small or micro establishments that are unregulated, untaxed with no formal employment relationships or any links to the formal institutions of a country.
We try to incorporate these institutional features in a three sector model of child labor where children may either work in Agriculture, or the Services sector. The Services sector (for the lack of a better name) attempts to incorporate the informal sector into the model. It is assumed that children do not work in the Manufacturing sector. Also, the Services sector produces a non-tradeable good while those produced by Agriculture and Manufacturing may be traded. It may be useful to visualize this setup in terms of a Cocoa exporting country of SubSaharan Africa. Cocoa is the exportable commodity and its production routinely involves child labor in these nations. Children also work in the informal sector. Suppose a sanction is imposed on cocoa exports, it will contract the cocoa sector and set off general equilibrium adjustments in the goods and factor markets. A-priori it is difficult to know the direction of these adjustments and their effects on child labor. Our model and analysis provides some insights on this issue.
We find that the effect of a change in the terms of trade on child labor critically depends on the pattern of substitutability (or complementarity) between the Services sector and the 6 Note that under complementarity, the excess demand for the non-traded good rises and therefore there are two opposing effects on the demand for child labor. In general, the fall in demand in the traded sector may be offset by the rise in demand by the non-traded sector with ambiguous effect on the net final demand for child labor. Our model structure is designed to highlight this possibility and presents a case where the rise or fall in child labor in response to a terms of trade movement depends precisely on the nature of substitutability in excess demand functions. 5 exportable sector. If the export good is a substitute (complement) for the non-traded good, then an improvement in the terms of trade must raise (reduce) child labor. This result is surprising because one expects that a trade sanction on the export good produced by child labor should lead to a reduction in child labor. Clearly, that is not true under complementarity. This result holds regardless of whether the sanction is imposed in period-1 or in period-2 (in this two period model). This may be explained as follows. Under substitutability between the traded sector and the non-traded sector, a sanction in period-1 that reduces price of the export good will reduce the excess demand for the non-traded good. Thus, the unskilled wage in that period must fall. This will lead to a greater incentive for skill acquisition and lead to lower child labor. 6 A second period sanction has a similar effect on the second period unskilled wage. Of course, that raises the skill premium and raises the incentive to acquire skills, thereby reducing child labor. While sanctions in either period leads to lower child labor (under substitutability), they work through different channels. The first period sanctions works through the cost side of the education decision. It reduces the opportunity cost of sending a child to school by lowering the first period wage. The second period sanction works through benefit side of the equation. It raises the skill premium and encourages more children to acquire education, thereby reducing child labor.
Section-2 presents the basic model and the analysis. Section-3 discusses modeling choices that we have made and how our conclusions may be affected under alternate 7 We assume that this is a small open economy which exports A and imports M. Therefore, the prices of A and M are exogenous to the model. However, the price of V is endogenously determined. M is assumed to be the numeraire good and we further assume that its price is constant between the two periods. Thus, the price of M in both periods is set to unity. Changes in terms of trade are exogenous changes in the price of A in either period-1 or period-2 (or both). 8 We believe this to be a sensible depiction of reality in developing nations. For example, children from educated middle class or upper class families in India do not work as child labor. It is extremely unusual for an affluent family to send its children to work as unskilled labor -the explanation may lie in the history or in social norms. 6 assumptions. Section-4 briefly discusses alternate policy choices outside the arena of trade policy that may be yield better outcomes. Section-5 concludes.
The Model and Analysis
Let there be three representative households: skilled, unskilled and landowning. There are three goods, manufacturing (M), agriculture (A) and services (V) and two periods (1 and 2).
M and A are traded by this small open economy.
7 V is a non-traded good. The landowners have an endowment of land T G in both periods. They do not supply labor, have no children and simply consume their income from land. The skilled households are characterized by an endowment of adult skilled labor S G in period-1. These households have children all of whom acquire education (i.e., they supply no child labor). 8 In period-2, the skilled adults (of period-1) retire and their children grow up to supply skilled labor. Unskilled households are characterized by adult unskilled labor L G in period-1. Their children either perform child labor (C u ) or acquire education. Adults in period-1 retire from the labor force in period-2. The children who receive education in period-1 grow up to be skilled adults in period-2. The child labor from period-1 grow up to be unskilled adult labor in period-2. Let θ be the number of children per unit of adult labor for both skilled and unskilled households. We also assume that there are no credit 9 The issue of credit markets has already been explored in the literature by Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) . Similarly the issue of survival has been explored by Basu and Van (1998) . Extensions of our model can incorporate these. However, we choose to focus on other issues in this paper. 10 We assume that marginal disutility from child labor is positive and increasing in it (i.e., βN and βO are both positive).
11 The optimization problems for the other households may be similarly derived. The important difference is that they are assumed not to supply any child labor.
12 In section-3 of the paper, we explore the role of this assumption in driving our results by analyzing the basic model with a standard homothetic utility function. Let the utility function of an unskilled household in both periods from consumption be described by ũ. Also, let β(C u ) capture the disutility from child labor. 10 The household discounts the future at the rate δ. skilled (j = s), unskilled (j = u). Child labor is assumed to earn the unskilled wage. The cost of education for an unskilled (skilled) family is e u (e s ). It is the adult unskilled (skilled) labor time used up to provide successful education to their respective children.
Unskilled households have the following optimization problem:
subject to the following constraints:
We assume that the utility function is quasi-linear and takes the form:
13 In reality, there is heterogeneity in this category. An affluent slum dweller may send his children to school at least part time. On the other hand, the poorest of the slum dwellers are unlikely to afford that luxury. There are people in between who may fit in well in terms of making marginal choices depending on their access to education. We felt that a good compromise in our modeling is to lump these into the unskilled category and consider the choice between school and work as a marginal decision.
8
The solution to this problem yields: 
If the inequality is strictly negative we have C u = 0. With no child labor in unskilled households we will not have a sensible child labor problem to consider. At the other extreme it is possible that all the children in the unskilled household are child laborers (C u = θL G ). These are uninteresting cases where marginal policy changes will not make a difference in reducing child labor or skill acquisition. Therefore, we focus on the interior solution. In this case, we have a mix in unskilled households, with some children receiving education, and marginal policy changes having an impact on this mix.
13
On the production side, we assume that the economy is characterized by competitive firms producing the three goods. M uses unskilled and skilled labor and is CRS in the two inputs. Skilled labor is specific to M. Good-A is CRS in land and unskilled labor. Land is specific to A and is given at the same level, T G , throughout our analysis. Thus, sector-A exhibits diminishing returns to unskilled labor. V is assumed to be produced by unskilled labor only.
The production functions are:
where M i , A i and V i are the production of the three goods in period
, and L i v are the 9 unskilled labor used in the sectors M, A and V, respectively, in period-i. S i M is the skilled labor used in M in period-i. T G is the land used in A in each period. We assume that manufacturing employs unskilled adult labor only. Child labor is not used in the organized manufacturing sector but is used in agriculture and services. 14 First period factor supply and demand must satisfy the following relationships: There is no child labor in period-2. Thus:
Competitive profit maximization yields: 
Using (5) and (5N) in (2b) and focusing on the interior solution, we have:
(6) implicitly defines (suppressing δ):
15 V s and V T are the demand functions for the non-traded good by the skilled households and landowners, respectively. Their choice rules are similar to relation (2a). 
Noting relations (4a), (4b) and (6N), and denoting C u (p 1 v , p 2 v , e u ) by C u (.), the revenue function describing the supply side in periods 1 and 2 (suppressing T G ) are:
and,
The supply function for the non-traded good in the two periods are MR 
where R j i (.) is the partial derivative of the revenue function in the j-th period with respect to the ith argument (i.e., R 1 2 is the supply of V in period-1). Suppressing the labor endowments and the parameter θ and noting that p 1 M is fixed at unity, (9) implicitly defines:
Period-2 equilibrium in the non-traded market requires that:
where, using (10) it is easy to see that D 1 must be negative. Using (13) and (14):
Relation-(15) completes the first part of the proof.
Using (10): dp 1 v /dp )(dp 2 v /dp A 1 ).
Using the above equations we can show that: dp 2 v /dp 
From (14aN) we find that the sign of dp 2 v /dp A 1 is opposite of the sign of (Mp 1 v /Mp A 1 ). Under substitutability this implies that dp 2 v /dp 
implies that dp 1 v /dp 
Using the envelope properties of the indirect utility function and noting that in equilibrium p 1 v and p 2 v must equal w u 1 and w 2 u , respectively, we have:
u }dp 2 v = -A 1 u dp 1 A -V 1 u dp 1 v -δV 2 u dp 2 v + dσ
where, dσ u* = {C u (1+e u ) + L G (1-e u θ)}dp It can be shown that S is negative. Thus, dσ u* /dp ) and raises w 2 s . Unskilled households benefit from a rise in the wage income in period-1, are hurt by the loss of unskilled wage income from period-2 but benefit in that period from a higher skilled wage earned by the educated members of the family. As we show above, the beneficial effects dominate, assuming consumption of A and V are sufficiently small for these families. 14 Proof :
Section-2.2: Improvement in the terms of trade in period-2 (i.e., rise in p
Using (6N), (10) and (12), we can show that:
V 2 }(dp V 2 /dp 2 A ).
Using (6N) and (10) ) is the same as that of (dp V 2 /dp 2 A ). Using (6N) and (10) through (12), we find that: dp V 2 /dp 2
where, ED v2 = V D2 -R 2 2 = Excess Demand Function for the non-traded good in period-2. From (20) we find that the sign of dp V 2 /dp 2 A is the same as the sign of (MED (16) and a modified version of (17) (noting that for this sub-section, dp 1 A =0, dp 2 A …0):
Y dσ u* /dp 2 A = Z(dp 2 v /dp 2 A ),
where Z is defined following proposition-1. It can be shown that:
The first term on the right hand side of (22) is positive, while the other two are negative.
Therefore Z cannot be signed. Relation- (20) shows that the sign of (dp 2 v /dp 2 A ) depends on whether V is a substitute or complement of A (in period-2). Assuming substitutability, (20), (21) and (22) imply that the sign of (dσ u* /dp 2 A ) is the same as that of Z. If Z is negative, a terms of trade improvement in period-2 must reduce unskilled utility for sufficiently small consumption of goods A and V by these households. This case contrasts the utility result for the previous 15 section.  Comment-2: It is interesting to compare and contrast the implications of the two propositions.
Both suggest that a terms of trade improvement in a particular period will lead to a rise in child labor if and only if the non-traded good is a substitute for the export good in the respective
period. An implication of this finding is that a trade sanction (in either period) on nations using child labor will lead to a reduction in child labor if and only if the respective substitutability conditions are satisfied. However, the utility effects (on unskilled families) of the sanctions in the two periods under substitutability (i.e., in the situation when the sanction is effective in reducing child labor) may be opposite. Suppose we ignore the consumption effects (i.e., assume that A 1 u , V 1 u , A u 2 and V 2 u are zero). A first period sanction must reduce utility. On the other hand, a second period sanction that reduces p A 2 raises p 1 v and the unskilled utility. This effect may dominate the other effects and lead to a rise in unskilled utility. The result is striking and has interesting policy implications. It seems to suggest that a sanction in the future (that is effective in reducing child labor) may be better than a current sanction from the perspective of the unskilled families. A practical application of this result will be to have pre-announced sanctions to be imposed in future periods on goods using child labor.
Section-3: Modeling Choices and Relevance of Modeling Assumptions

3.1: Homothetic Preferences
In this sub-section we explore the role that quasi-linearity plays in driving our results by replacing that assumption by homotheticity. Equations (1a) through (1c) are still valid. We 16 replace (1d) by:
The solution to the utility maximization problem (assuming an interior solution for child labor) is:
is the marginal utility of income in period-i.
Since ũ j (.) (where j=1,2,3) is homogeneous of degree zero, (2aN) implies that: 
Using (23a) and (23b) and noting the homogeneity of degree zero of ũ j (.):
Using (24) in (2bN):
Relation-(2bO) implicitly defines:
The production side of the model is unchanged. Using (5) and (5N):
Using (23a) and (23b) and assuming all households (skilled, unskilled and landowners) have identical and homothetic preferences (over the commodities), we have :
, where M Di is the aggregate demand for M in period-i.
Trade balance in period-i requires: 
Using the logic of (26a):
Using (26b) in (27) and arranging terms: 
Using (29) in (28) and using (26a):
Note from relation- (8) Using this fact in (30a), we have:
Using (30b), the market clearing equations for the two periods for the non-traded good are:
Relation-(31) defines:
Using (32) in (2bO) and noting (5) 
Relation-(33a) implicitly defines:
The left hand side of (33a) is the net marginal benefit from supplying child labor. Assuming that this net benefit function to be downward sloping with respect to C u , and using the implicit function theorem on (33a) and (33b), we find that: 
It is clear from (34) and (35) Suppose that a rise in p i A leads to a greater consumption of good-M in period-i (i.e., they are substitutes in consumption), this will lead to a lower marginal utility of consumption from M. . This tends to raise child labor. However, there are two other effects. The induced rise in p 1 v will lower ũ 3 assuming that M and V are substitutes in consumption. This lowers the utility value of first period wage relative to the value of skill premium and tends to reduce child labor. Similarly, the direct effect of p 1 A on the marginal utility of good-M is also negative and therefore adds to the possibility of a reduction in child labor (faced with a terms of trade improvement). 
3.2: The Model Without the Non-Traded Good
We highlight the role of the non-traded good in our analysis by providing a specific factor model along the lines of section-2 with one important difference -the absence of the service sector. Let utility function for all households be quasi-linear of the following form:
where u(.) is strictly concave. Relation-(2b) carries over to this context. Therefore:
Using (37) and suppressing e u and e s , note that::
, and,
Let p 1 A remain constant at unity. It can be shown that: dC u /dp 2 A = µ(dw 2 u /dp 2 A ), where,
It can be shown that µ and (dw 2 u /dp 2 A ) are both positive. Therefore, MC u /Mp 2 A > 0.
Proposition-3
In a two sector, three factor model, where land is specific to the exportable sector (A) and skilled labor to the importable sector (M), a terms of trade improvement necessarily raises child labor.
Proof and Comment:
Relation-(26) and the discussion above complete the proof. This proposition is important as a benchmark. It shows that the presence of the non-traded good is crucial to our analysis. Without it, a terms of trade improvement leads to an unambiguous rise in child labor. 
3.3: The Model With Intersectoral Factor Mobility
In this section we consider production characterized by the three sectors, all using three factors, unskilled labor, skilled labor and land. The production functions are CRS. Competitive profit maximization conditions yield: ; and, 19 We know from Ethier (1984) and other related contributions that it is not easy to generalize Stolper-Samuelson type results in higher dimensions without imposing further restrictions. Therefore, to highlight our central results without getting into the details of higher dimensional issues, we choose to use a reasonable special case for our purpose. 
Using (40), (41) and the interior solution for (2b):
Relation-(42) implies that:
Using (43) and the first period equilibrium for the non-traded good, we have:
Using (43) and (44) in the second period equilibrium condition, we get:
It is easy to check that dp 2 v /dp 2 A > 0, if V is a substitute for A in period-2. Using (43) through (45), we have: dC u /dp 2 A = X(dp 2 v /dp 2 
Using (47), we can show that: X and Y are both positive. Thus, assuming substitutability, (46) implies that dC u /dp 2 A >0. On the other hand, since Y>0, (46) suggests that under complementarity the sign of (dC u /dp 2 A ) is ambiguous.
Proposition-4
In a 3x3 Heckscher-Ohlin type model characterized by Cobb-Douglas technology with equal factor shares between non-intensive factors, a terms of trade improvement in period-2 leads to an increase in child labor if the non-traded labor intensive good is a substitute for the land intensive export good. If it is a complement, then the effect of the terms of trade on child labor is ambiguous.
Proof and Comment:
Relations (46) and (47) A fall in e u has two effects, both of which reduce child labor by lowering the effective cost of education as described in (6N). First, it raises the labor available for production in period-1. This expands production in V, reduces p 1 v (=w 1 u ) and hence the cost of education as well.
Second, it lowers the effective cost of education directly as is clear on inspection of relation-(6N).
On the other hand, a rise in e s reduces the amount of skilled labor available to the economy (for production) in period-1. As skilled labor used in production falls, sector-M contracts. More
